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Gender Blindness and the Hunter Doctrine
Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1997). reh'g
en banc denied, Nos. 97-15030, 97-15031, 1997 WL 528335 (9th Cir. Aug. 21,
1997).
As a factual matter, the recent reinstatement of the California Civil Rights
Initiative (CCRI)' withdrew many opportunities for racial minorities and
women in important public sectors.2 As a legal matter, the Ninth Circuit
decision that justified this result-Coalition for Economic Equity : Wilson
(CEE) 3-rests on questionable grounds. The court employed novel reasoning
to distinguish the Supreme Court's "political structure" equal protection
precedent-the so-called Hunter doctrine'-which invalidates initiatives that
obstruct minorities seeking beneficial local legislation. The CEE court held that
the Hunter doctrine provides "equal protection rights against political
obstructions to equal treatment," not "equal protection rights against political
obstructions to preferential treatment." 5 Premising its argument on the heavy
constitutional presumption against race-based preferences, the court explained:
Since the Equal Protection Clause "barely permits" such preferences, given the
1. CCRI, now codified at CAL CONST an. I. § 31(a), provides in pertinent par that the government
"shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to. any individual or group on the basis of
race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin" in public contracting, employment, or education
2. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson (CEE), 946 F Supp 1480. 1495-99 (N D Cal 1996)
(detailing findings of fact that prove the likelihood of "irreparable injury" suffered by racial minontic s and
women), rev'd on other grounda, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir 1997). rdh'g en banc denied. Nos 97-15030. 97-
15031, 1997 WL 528335 (9th Cir. Aug. 21. 1997)
3. 110 F.3d 1431, reh'g en batic denied, Nos 97-15030. 97-15031. 1997 WL 528335 (9th Cir Aug
21, 1997).
4. The doctrine's two leading cases are Hwuer v Ericbon. 393 U S 385 (1969). which invalidated
an initiative uniquely requiring the city council to secure the electorate's approval for antidiscrimination
housing programs; and Washington v. Seattle School District Number 1. 458 U S 457 (1982). which
invalidated a state constitutional amendment that barred local school boards rom enacting desegregative
busing. Under the doctrine, a state action involves an impermissible classification if it singles out an "tsuc
of particular interest" to racial minorities or women and "imposels a nocl political burden on all future
efforts to enact" such legislation. CEE, 946 F. Supp at 1500
5. CEE, 110 F.3d at 1445 (emphasis added)
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rigors of strict scrutiny, the "political structure" cases surely do not require
unencumbered political access to them.6
In this Case Note, I accept for argument's sake CEE's interpretation of the
Hunter doctrine. I argue that the court's use of strict scrutiny to do its heavy
lifting involved significant slippage with regard to sex-based equal protection.
Although CEE's holding applies to race- and sex-based programs, its analysis
depends on factors unique to race-based strict scrutiny: the most restrictive
means and purpose tests,7 the underlying fact that courts persistently disfavor
race-based preferences, and the rhetoric of colorblindness. None of these
factors applies to current sex equality doctrine, however, rendering the
application of CEE's final conclusions to sex-based preferences problematic.
I
The CEE court reached its conclusion by relying principally on the
Supreme Court's race neutrality cases. Citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena8 and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,9 Judge O'Scannlain
explained that race-based preferences are "prohibit[ed] ... in all but the most
compelling circumstances."' The court also cited United States v. Virginia
(VM/)"-the first and last time a sex equality case was mentioned in the
court's political structure analysis-for that case's strongest proposition: Sex-
based classifications "demand an 'exceedingly persuasive justification.""'
Based on these precedents, the court explained that the Constitution "erects
obstructions to preferential treatment by its own terms."' 3 Yet the profound
difference in "terms" that current doctrine mandates for race, as distinct from
sex, and the resulting difference in "obstructions" were never discussed.
Instead, the court's subsequent analysis conflated race and sex further. The
court reasoned that states can enact (or not enact) all other constitutionally
6. See id.
7. Strict scrutiny employs the most rigid means and purpose tests by demanding that a classification
be a "necessary" means for advancing a "compelling" state interest; intermediate scrutiny, which applied
to gender classifications, requires only that a classification have a "substantial relationship" to an
"important" state interest. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 219-20 (1995).
8. 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to a federal minority set-aside program).
9. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion) (applying strict scrutiny to a city minority set-aside
program).
10. CEE, 110 F.3d at 1445 (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493
(plurality opinion))).
11. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (invalidating a state-sponsored military college's exclusion of women).
12. CEE, 110 F.3d at 1446 (quoting VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2275). CEE's reliance on the phrase
"exceedingly persuasive justification" is questionable; the VMI majority's use of the phrase was criticized
for being rhetorically misleading. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2288 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (arguing that
the conventional terms of intermediate scrutiny "have more content and specificity than does the phrase
'exceedingly persuasive justification' . . . [which] is best confined, as it was first used, as an observation
on the difficulty of meeting the applicable test, not as a formulation of the test itself" (citing Personnel
Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)).
13. CEE, 110 F.3d at 1445.
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permissible classifications and that it therefore would be "anomalous" if states
were required to make readily available "preferences based on the most suspect
and presumptively unconstitutional classifications-race and gender."'" This
analysis bootstraps sex into the same position as race.
In the remainder of the court's argument, sex-based analysis dropped out.
The court submitted that the Fourteenth Amendment's commitment to
colorblindness invites rooting out laws that erroneously claim "race somehow
matters."' 5 The court also paraphrased Adarand's strongest language, 6 a
necessary step before its penultimate statement that the Constitution "barely
permits" such programs.' 7 With these claims as its predicate, the court
ultimately resolved, "[I]t would be paradoxical to conclude that by adopting
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the voters of the
state thereby had violated it."....
The court's rationale has since prompted the plaintiffs to claim that CEE
imported Justice Scalia's repudiated theory of absolute colorblindness. Their
claim is convincing since CEE's holding effectively means racial minorities
may seek only neutral programs under the Hunter doctrine. Perhaps most
significantly, though, CEE concerns race and sex classifications. That is, Judge
O'Scannlain's opinion ratcheted up the legal force of colorblindness while
incidentally latching sex "equality" to it.
II
Under current law, the level of scrutiny given to sex classifications as
compared to race classifications involves differences in both degree and
kind.2 Consequently, whenever CEE notes special rigors that attach to race-
based preferences, the argument strays further from applicability to gender.
14. Id. at 1446.
15. Id.
16. See id. ("The Constitution permits the people to grant a narrowly tailored racial preference only
if they come forward with a compelling interest to back it up " (citing Adarand Constructors. Inc v Pena.
515 U.S. 200, 230 (1995))).
17. Id.
18. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S 527. 535 (1982))
19. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 18 (contrasting Justice Scalia's theory with controlling
precedent), CEE, Nos. 97-15030, 97-15031, 1997 WL 528335, denving reh'g en banc of I10 F3d 1431
(9th Cir. 1997); cf, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia. J. concumng) (joining the opinion -except
insofar as ... [imn my view, government can never have a 'compelling interest"' in using racial
classifications to remedy past discrimination).
20. The Supreme Court may be moving the standards of evaluation for sex classilications closer to
the strict scrutiny test. See Collin O'Connor Udell, Note. Signaling a New Direction in Gender
Classification Scrutiny: United States v. Virginia, 29 CONN. L REv 521 (1996) My argument, however.
concerns the current case law, in which gender classifications are controlled by the "substantially related
means" and "important governmental interest" tests See supra note 7. cf Christina Gleason. Comment.
United States v. Virginia: Skeptical Scruttn'y and the Future of Gender Discrunination Law. 70 ST JoHN'S
L. REv. 801, 815-18 (1997) (analyzing the continuing divide separating intermediate scrutiny for gender
from the rigors of strict scrutiny for race). Indeed, CEE accepts these conventional terms See CEE. 110
F.3d at 1440.
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Indeed, the standards of intermediate scrutiny would likely favor many
sex-based programs that CCRI bans. Numerous justifications for sex-based
classifications can satisfy the "important state interest" test.2' And under the
"substantially related" test the Court generally will not second-guess legislative
uses of such classifications, even when neutral alternatives are conceivable.2"
Sex-based preferences, in short, are far from "barely permit[ted]."
In practice, the level of scrutiny can decide the fate of preferential
programs. As Justice Stevens explained in Adarand: Equal protection law now
"produce[s] the anomalous result that the Government can more easily enact
affirmative action programs to remedy discrimination against women than it
can enact affirmative action programs to remedy discrimination against African
Americans."23 Indeed, this pivotal difference had not previously escaped
Judge O'Scannlain and the Ninth Circuit.24
CEE discusses "the goal of the Fourteenth Amendment" 25 only in relation
to race; "the goal of the Fourteenth Amendment" in relation to gender,
however, harmonizes with the pursuit of public sector preferences for women.
A principal reason for heightening scrutiny of sex classifications has been to
21. See, e.g., Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 745-46 (1984) (preserving pensioners' financial
expectations); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981) (raising and supporting armies); Michael M.
v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 473 (1981) (plurality opinion) (preventing teenage pregnancy); Califano
v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (per curiam) (redressing societal discrimination against women);
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1974) (reducing economic disparities between the sexes); see also
Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 567-68 (1990) (advancing viewpoint diversity), overruled on
other grounds by Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227; Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(Thomas, J.) (explaining that Metro Broadcasting's holding that viewpoint diversity constitutes an important
government interest applies to gender).
22. See Michael M., 450 U.S. at 473 (plurality opinion); id. at 481 (Stewart, J., concurring) ('ITilhe
issue, of course, is not whether the statute could have been drafted more wisely, but whether the lines
chosen ... are within constitutional limitations."' (citing Kahn, 416 U.S. at 356 n.10)); see also Rostker,
453 U.S. at 70 (noting that the Court must decide whether the classification denies equal protection, not
what alternative it would choose). But cf Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 n.13 (1979) (comparing
alternatives to sex classification in evaluating the state's asserted interest).
23. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 247 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24. Two leading Ninth Circuit cases invalidated race-based preferences in city contracting while
upholding sex-based preferences under the same legislative scheme. See Coral Constr. Co. v. King County,
941 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922
(9th Cir. 1987). Notably, Associated General Contractors is the case Justice Stevens cited for his argument
inAdarand. See 515 U.S. at 247 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Coral Construction, Judge O'Scannlain himself
expressly recognized that intermediate scrutiny uniquely permits local government "broad power" to adopt
preferences for women:
Unlike the strict standard of review applied to race-conscious programs, intermediate scrutiny
does not require any showing of governmental involvement, active or passive, in the
discrimination it seeks to remedy .... [Wle [have] observed that the "government has the broad
power to assure that physical differences between men and women are not translated into
permanent handicaps, and that they do not serve as a subterfuge for those who would exclude
women from participating fully in our economic system."
Coral Constr Co., 941 F.2d at 932 (citation omitted). Notably, the structure of the argument Judge
O'Scannlain adopted in Coral Construction is remarkably different from the analytic organization of CEE.
The former opinion separately analyzed the discrete questions raised by strict and intermediate scrutiny,
rather than virtually collapsing them under one framework as CEE does.
25. CEE, 110 F.3d at 1446.
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remove barriers generated by past and persistent economic discrimination. 6
Moreover, the Supreme Court's equal protection analysis takes account of
societal discrimination against women2 7 and endorses preferences to equalize
those conditions. 2s As such, CEE's distinction between "political obstructions
to equal treatment" and "political obstructions to preferential treatment"29 is
patently incoherent in the context of sex.
CEE's use of colorblindness-to explain why minorities may seek only
neutral interests in the political process-betrays a clear indication that the
court's framework does not work for sex. Supreme Court doctrine has no
colorblindness analogue for sex.3 1 In fact, the long line of "similarly situated"
sex equality cases 3' maintains a large divide between gender jurisprudence
and conservative theories of constitutional colorblindness. That is, current
doctrine recognizes that men and women are often not similarly situated-due
26. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S 199, 242 (1977) (Rehnquist. J . dissenting) (stating that
"economic discrimination ... has been the basis for heightened scrutiny of gender-based classifications").
cf id. at 221 (Stevens, J., concurring) (finding legislation invalid because it was "'not the product of a
conscious purpose to redress the 'legacy of economic discrimination' against females" (citation omitted))
27. See Kahn, 416 U.S. at 353; cf id. at 358-59 (Brennan, J, dissenting) ("Illn providing special
benefits for a needy segment of society long the victims of discrimination and neglect. the statute serves
the compelling state interest of achieving equality for such groups "')
28. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (per cunam). see also Michael MI v Superior
Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981) (plurality opinion) ("[A] legislature may 'provide for the special problems
of women."' (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636. 653 (1975))). Goldfarb. 430 U S at 209
n.8 (distinguishing Kahn, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Schlesinger v Ballard. 419 U S 498 (1975))
In fact, several Supreme Court decisions striking down preferences for women have been analyzed
according to the Equal Protection Clause's protection of women from discrnmination In a series of
cases-what we may call the "double-edged discnmination" decisions. set, Vengler v Druggists Mut Ins
Co., 446 U.S. 142, 152 (1980)--the Court based its holdings substantially on its determination that
programs favoring one group of women actually injured other women's interests See. e g. it (Invalidating
workers' compensation preferences for widows because the program discnminated against female wage
earners whose widowers did not receive the same benefits); id at 147-49 (describing cases that accord with
this framework, such as Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 242. Weinberger. 420 U S at 636. and Frnnero v
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)). In another set of decisions, the Court invalidated legislation purportedly
benefitting women based on conclusions that so-called favoritism actually involved archaic generalizations
or regressive role-typing. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ for Women v Hogan. 458 U S 718, 725 (1982).
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 207; Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U S 7, 15 (1975) Considered together, these decisions
suggest (1) that equal protection analysis for sex ries primarily to ensure proper preferential purposes. and
(2) that a commitment to improving women's status guides such determinations
29. CEE, 110 F.3d at 1445 (emphasis added); see supra text accompanying note 5
30. In fact, some of the Justices who most ardently advocate the immediate adoption of a legal system
"in which race no longer matters," CEE, 110 F3d at 1446 (citation omitted), are those most receptive to
sex classifications. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE., AMERICAN CONSTmrrLONAL LAw § 16-27. at 1569 & n 32
(2d ed. 1988) (contrasting Justice Rehnquist's theory of race neutrality with his theory of difference for
sex); see also United States v. Virginia (VMI). 116 S C1 2264. 2295-96 (1996) (Scalia. J . dissenting)
(claiming that sounder arguments exist for lowenng sex equality review to rational basis than for elevating
it to strict scrutiny); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U S 127, 154 (1994) (Rehnquist. C J. dissenting)
(arguing that "sufficient differences between race and gender discnmination" mean that the Constitution's
prohibition of race-based peremptory challenges should not extend to sex). id at 157-58 (Scalta. J.
dissenting) (suggesting the principle of vive la difference for constitutional questions ol sex)
31. E.g., Michael M., 450 U.S. at 469 (plurality opinion) (-[Thel Court has consistently upheld statutes
[that] realistically reflect[] the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated "(citing Parham v Hughes, 441
U.S. 347 (1979); Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam). Schlesinger. 419 U S 498 (1975), Kahn. 416
U.S. 351 (1974))).
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to sociological,32 physiological,33 or preexisting legal34 conditions-an
acknowledgment that is conceptually incongruent with the proposition that
individuals of different races are, in general, similarly situated.35 Also, in a
"not similarly situated" case, the means and purpose tests may be
suspended,36 and the constitutional presumption may shift to favor the
legislation.37 In short, CEE's strong use of colorblindness to interpret the
Hunter doctrine reveals the inappropriateness of applying its reasoning to sex.
III
The argument pursued here leads to several conclusions, a full elaboration
of which is beyond the scope of this discussion. At a minimum, though, this
Case Note exposes an error in CEE's reasoning, suggesting the need for
review. The Ninth Circuit's confusion of sex-based equal protection and strict
scrutiny-especially in a case justifying the permanent withdrawal of state
preferences for women-runs afoul of doctrinal principles and precedent.
The Case Note's argument also puts into doubt the viability of the
preference-focused framework itself. CEE recast the Hunter doctrine by
shifting the focus of constitutional inquiry from the initiatives in question to
the programs that the initiatives prohibit. Yet this framework-if faithfully
executed-produces an anomalous result: broader legal protections for women
than for racial minorities. Can the application of the Hunter doctrine-which
has primarily focused on invalidating "[s]tate action [that] 'places special
burdens on racial minorities in the political process'". 38 -yield broader
political rights for a group that occupies a lower rung of the equal protection
ladder? Perhaps to avoid this anomalous result, hombook law on the Hunter
doctrine makes no distinction between "preferential treatment" and "equal
treatment. 39 CEE's ability to avoid this same anomalous result, on the other
hand, arguably depends on its misanalysis of sex equality doctrine.
-Ryan Goodman
32. See, e.g., Michael M., 450 U.S. at 471 (plurality opinion).
33. See, e.g., id. (plurality opinion); id. at 481 (Stewart, J., concurring).
34. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 76, 78 (1981); Parham, 441 U.S. at 355; Schlesinger,
419 U.S. at 508.
35. See Michael M., 450 U.S. at 478 (Stewart, J., concurring).
36. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 94 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing differences in "similarly situated"
analysis as illustrated by comparison of the majority opinion and Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 463 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring)),
37. See Michael M., 450 U.S. at 497-98 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In cases involving discrimination
between men and women, the natural differences between the sexes are sometimes relevant ... [making
it] appropriate to presume that the classification is lawful."); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 409-10
(1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf. Parham, 441 U.S. at 351-52 (1979) (noting a presumption of statutory
validity absent invidious discrimination).
38. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1., 458 U.S. 457, 470 (1982) (quoting Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969)).
39. See, e.g., JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrTTIONAL LAW 659-61 (5th ed. 1995).
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